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CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN THE COMMONWEALTH:
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
GOVERNORS AND ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Michael Signer *
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Virginia, like many other states across the
country, has confronted the difficult question of whether the Gov-
ernor or the Attorney General has the right to control the legal
strategies of state agencies. The issue frequently arises in contro-
versial cases that possess both legal and political dimensions,
such as whether state-run colleges and universities may practice
affirmative action, or whether redrawn legislative boundaries are
unconstitutionally gerrymandered. In states such as Virginia,
where the Attorney General is charged with the representation of
agencies, the issue is how to determine, using constitutional prin-
ciples, whether the Governor or the Attorney General should pre-
vail.
With the election in 2005 of Timothy M. Kaine as Governor and
Robert F. McDonnell as Attorney General, the Commonwealth of
Virginia is facing its second four year term in which the two of-
ficeholders belong to different parties. The prospect for conflict
over legal and policy choices at the agency level is therefore sig-
nificant. In fact, in early 2006, soon after taking office, Attorney
General McDonnell issued an opinion finding that an Executive
Order issued by Governor Kaine barring sexual discrimination
against gays and lesbians at state agencies1 was unconstitutional
* Associate, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP, Washington, D.C. B.A.,
1995, Princeton University; Ph.D., 2001, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 2004,
University of Virginia School of Law. The author served as Deputy Counselor to Governor
Mark R. Warner in 2005. He wishes to thank Professor A.E. Dick Howard, Robert M. Blue,
Walter McFarlane, Lane Kneedler, and Professor Richard Schragger for their contribu-
tions and insights.
1. See Exec. Order No. 1 (2006) (Jan. 14, 2006), available at www.governor.virginia.
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because "the addition of sexual orientation as a protected em-
ployment class within state government was intended to, and in
fact did, alter the public policy of the Commonwealth."2
In this article, I argue the solution to agency conflict and the
broader problem of establishing the proper scope of executive au-
thority lies in establishing that Virginia has a "statutory" rather
than a "common-law" model of the Attorney General's powers,
and that the Office of the Attorney General is therefore circum-
scribed by statute. Contrary to popular understanding, I will ar-
gue that Wilder v. Attorney General of Virginia3 effectively estab-
lishes Virginia as a statutory state and resolves the conflict in
favor of the Governor. Because the Supreme Court of Virginia is
unlikely to act more strongly in favor of the statutory model,
however, the best long-term solution to Virginia's constitutional
conflict lies in a statutory change by the legislature to establish a
"Governor's counsel" in each state agency.
Agency representation poses additional questions of broader
significance. While the original intent of assigning the Attorney
General a monopoly over the representation of state agencies was
to provide agencies with more consistent and efficient legal repre-
sentation, times have changed. In an age of increasingly active
and ambitious attorneys general, the policy has given power to
the Attorney General at the expense of the Governor. Today, the
Attorney General's representation of agencies constitutes a strong
check on the executive. The larger issue is the proper scope of ex-
ecutive authority. In a time when theories such as the "unitary
executive" receive substantial discussion at the federal level, we
are witnessing an erosion of the power of governors at the hands
of attorneys general. Nowhere is the issue more pressing than in
the Commonwealth of Virginia, which has seen two constitutional
conflicts in the last twelve years, with every indication that more
will follow.
gov/Initiatives/ExecutiveOrders/pdf/EO l.pdf.
2. Op. to Hon. Robert G. Marshall (Feb. 24, 2006), available at www.oag.state.va.us/
opinions/2006opns/05-094w.pdf.
3. 247 Va. 119, 439 S.E.2d 398 (1994).
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II. AN AGE OF CONFLICT
A. The "Unitary Executive"
The topic of just how strong the executive branch should be
relative to other branches of government has received substantial
attention in recent years at the federal level. The 2001 memoran-
dum authored by John Yoo when he was at the Office of Legal
Counsel arguing in favor of the "unitary executive" theory4 has
been hotly debated.5 Yoo's argument was that the Constitution's
description of the President as "Commander-in-Chief' confers on
the President essentially unlimited discretion to make policies
linked to military decisions.6 In his memorandum, Yoo wrote:
"The centralization of authority in the President alone is particu-
larly crucial in matters of national defense, war, and foreign pol-
icy, where a unitary executive can evaluate threats, consider pol-
icy choices, and mobilize national resources with a speed and
energy that is far superior to any other branch."7
Later, Yoo would write a book elaborating the argument, The
Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs
after 9/11.8 Yoo's critics have argued that his argument has am-
bitions for dangerously restructuring the executive branch:
"[N]amely, to endow the president with power over foreign affairs
virtually identical to that of the king of England."9 Supporters,
most notably Vice President Dick Cheney, argue that executive
independence has weakened, and that the United States is worse
for it.1 o
4. Memorandum re: The President's Constitutional Authority To Conduct Military
Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, from John C. Yoo, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, to Timothy Flannigan, Deputy Counsel to the President
(Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm [hereinafter Yoo
Memorandum].
5. See David Cole, All Power to the President-The Case of John Yoo, NEW YORK
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Nov. 17, 2005, at 8; Ronald Dworkin, The Strange Case of Judge Alito,
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 23, 2006, at 14.
6. See Yoo Memorandum, supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005).
9. Cole, supra note 5, at 9.
10. See Peter Baker & Jim VandeHei, Clash Is Latest Chapter in Bush Effort to Widen
Executive Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at Al.
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Opponents argue that the executive branch should be only as
strong as the other two branches of government. The liberal col-
umnist Nat Hentoff, for instance, recently said that Yoo had justi-
fied an "imperial presidency" and cited James Madison in the
Federalist No. 47: 'The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a
few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."'11
While the debate has raged primarily at the federal level,12 it
has recently begun to descend to the state level. In March 2006,
the Yale Law Journal sponsored a symposium titled The Most
Dangerous Branch? Mayors, Governors, Presidents and the Rule
of Law: A Symposium on Executive Power.13 Professor William P.
Marshall of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
School of Law presented a paper expressly arguing that, in the
face of the embrace of a unitary executive at the federal level, the
fact that many states have divided executives between attorneys
general and governors and, in Marshall's view, have not suffered
adverse consequences, suggests that the federal executive should
be similarly divided. 14 As will be discussed, Professor Marshall's
conclusions differ substantially from those reached in this article.
However, Professor Marshall's article illuminates a central in-
sight: that the experience in the states can shed considerable
light on the federal question of the unitary executive.
B. Conflicts in Virginia
Conflicts in the states show the debate over the proper scope of
the chief executive's power should not be cabined to the federal
11. Nat Hentoff, Op-Ed., The Imperial President; Bush's Assault on Our Freedoms,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at A19 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 298 (James Madi-
son) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic 2003)).
12. Justice Samuel Alito was questioned regarding the "unitary executive" theory dur-
ing Supreme Court confirmation hearings. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 37-38, 43 (2006) (statements
of Sen. Schumer, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and Sen. Durbin, Member,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
13. Symposium, The Most Dangerous Branch? Mayors, Governors, Presidents and the
Rule of Law: A Symposium on Executive Power, 116 YALE L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 2006).
14. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?: Governors, Independent At-
torneys General, and the Lessons from the Divided Executive, 116 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
Oct. 2006) (manuscript on file with author).
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government. In the last twelve years, major conflicts have
erupted between the Attorney General and the Governor in Vir-
ginia. The first took place in 1992 between Governor Doug Wilder
and Attorney General Mary Sue Terry over representation of the
Virginia Retirement System ("VRS"). " In a highly public and con-
tentious dispute, Governor Wilder argued that, in the course of
publicly opposing several policies of the VRS, the Attorney Gen-
eral had effectively pre-empted herself from being able to serve
the Agency. 6 Attorney General Terry countered that she was re-
quired by statute to serve the Agency and that no disability had
been proven.17 The dispute went to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, where the Governor prevailed, and the court provided sug-
gestive if ambiguous language intimating a restriction on the At-
torney General's ability to import politics into its representation
of agencies.' 8
The second clash occurred in 2002 between Governor Mark
Warner and Attorney General Jerry Kilgore. This imbroglio cen-
tered on a redistricting plan authored by Republican members of
the General Assembly.19 In a reverse twist to the earlier dispute,
the Governor retained private counsel to sue the state agency in
charge of administering the plan, while state officials from the
Attorney General's office defended the Agency. 2° The Attorney
General won the case in front of the Supreme Court of Virginia,
which was not persuaded that the plan was racially gerryman-
dered in violation of state and federal law. 2' The conflict triggered
a range of wide-reaching secondary political conflicts, including
an eavesdropping scandal in which the executive director of the
Republican Party of Virginia was ultimately indicted.22
15. See John F. Harris, Va. Power Struggle in Court; Wilder, Terry Fight Over Pension
Fund, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1992, at D3; see also Wilder v. Attorney Gen. of Va., 247 Va.
119, 439 S.E.2d 398 (1994).
16. See Harris, supra note 15.
17. See Wilder, 247 Va. at 122, 439 S.E.2d at 400.
18. See id. at 127, 439 S.E.2d at 403.
19. See Tyler Whitley, Warner Takes Issue with Kilgore Move; Remap Decision "Not
Appropriate," Governor Says, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 13, 2002, at Al.
20. See Wilkins v. West, 264 Va. 447, 454, 571 S.E.2d 100, 103 (2002).
21. Id. at 477, 571 S.E.2d at 117.
22. See Alan Cooper & Tyler Whitley, GOP Chief Is Indicted, Resigns Job; Hearing Set
for April 19 in Eavesdropping Case, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 10, 2002, at Al.
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C. Conflicts in Other States
The troubled state of Virginia's executive branch becomes less
surprising when viewed against the backdrop of the nation. The
trend of increased activism by attorneys general often results in
direct clashes with governors. Three examples recently occurred
in Colorado, South Carolina, and New Mexico.
In Colorado, Governor Bill Owens, a Republican, signed a re-
districting bill into law in 2003 intended to affect the state's con-
gressional delegation.23 Attorney General Ken Salazar, a Democ-
rat, petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado to enjoin the
Secretary of State, Republican Donetta Davidson, from enforcing
the law.24 Davidson then sued Salazar, arguing that a lawsuit
against a government employee violated the attorney-client rela-
tionship.25 The court ruled in favor of Salazar, finding that the
Attorney General could bring an action to the state supreme court
"in matters of great public importance," because 'it is the func-
tion of the Attorney General ... to protect the rights of the pub-
lic."'26
South Carolina also recently saw a constitutional collision. At-
torney General Charlie Condon, who unsuccessfully ran for Gov-
ernor in 2002, was perhaps the most high-profile and contentious
Attorney General South Carolina has ever had.27 Whereas most
previous attorneys general had performed behind the scenes,
Condon, a Republican, took strongly ideological stands against
Governor Jim Hodges on a host of issues, from the Confederate
flag to sex education to abortion. 2' The tension between the two
culminated in a lawsuit Condon filed against Hodges in 2001 over
Hodges's transfer of $28.5 million from state colleges to the gen-
eral fund in an effort to balance the budget.29 In response, Hodges
argued that Condon lacked the legal authority to sue a Gover-
23. See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1224-25, 1227 (Colo. 2003).
24. See id. at 1227.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 1229 (quoting People ex rel. Miller v. Tool, 86 P. 224, 227 (Colo. 1905)).
27. See Henry Eichel, Spotlight Fades for Outspoken Condon; Attorney General Has
Been Quiet Since Losing His Bid for Governor, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 18, 2002, at
B12.
28. See id.
29. See State High Court Accepts Suit Against Hodges, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug.
26, 2001, at Y1.
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nor.3" Hodges's argument was ultimately rejected by the Supreme
Court of South Carolina, which ruled that the General Assembly,
not the Governor, possessed responsibility and authority for bal-
ancing the budget.3'
Finally, a clash directly parallel to that between Attorney Gen-
eral Kilgore and Governor Warner erupted in New Mexico in
2001 between Democratic Attorney General Patricia Madrid and
Republican Governor Gary Johnson.32 Madrid challenged the au-
thority of Johnson's private attorney to represent Johnson in re-
districting lawsuits in state and federal court.33 A similar conflict
had occurred in 2000, when a Johnson natural resources ap-
pointee feuded with Madrid over a federal lawsuit regarding a
Superfund site.34 The state supreme court concluded that Madrid,
rather than the Governor's official, had the authority both to file
and take charge of the lawsuit in federal court.3"
In addressing these conflicts, state supreme courts have an-
nounced decisions that range from the equivocal to the creative.
In 2003, the Supreme Court of Georgia split the baby, ruling that
neither the Governor nor Attorney General had the exclusive
power to determine the course of a state agency's litigation in
Perdue v. Baker.36 In 1975, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
found that when the Governor and Attorney General disagreed on
policy, the Attorney General should appoint a special assistant to
represent the Governor's interests in Secretary of Administration
& Finance v. Attorney General.37 However, the court added a
qualifier: "It is only where the Attorney General believes that
there is no merit to the appeal, or where the interests of a consis-
tent legal policy for the Commonwealth are at stake, that the At-
torney General should refuse representation at all."3" Thus, the
public policy conflict was reintroduced, rather than resolved, by
the opinion.
30. See id.
31. See State ex rel. Condon v. Hodges, 562 S.E.2d 623, 632 (S.C. 2002).
32. See Loie Fecteau, AG Challenges Governor, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 24, 2001, at
B8.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. 586 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 2003).
37. 326 N.E.2d 334 (Mass. 1975).
38. Id. at 339-40 n.8.
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III. THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
A. The Attorney General as Policymaker
Against the backdrop of these conflicts, surprisingly little at-
tention is given in the legal literature to resolving the conflict be-
tween a Governor and Attorney General. Standard legal norms
have, as a default, provided little resolution. Corpus Juris Secun-
dum, for instance, simply states a feel-good but ineffectual norm:
An attorney general's statutory authority to prosecute and defend all
actions brought by or against any state officer or instrumentality
simply provides the officer or instrumentality with access to the at-
torney general's legal services. It does not authorize the attorney
general to assert his or her vision of the state interest.
39
The mandate that the Attorney General should refrain from in-
serting policy visions into her legal strategies certainly sounds
good. But what if the Attorney General asserts her vision any-
way? Corpus Juris Secundum does say that in cases of conflict
over the execution of the state's laws, "[T]he governor retains the
supreme executive power to determine the public interest, and
the attorney general may act only subject to the powers of the
governor," but only in "some jurisdictions."0 A similarly idealistic
provision is found in a 1979 report by the National Association of
Attorneys General ("NAAG") on agency representation:
Many Attorneys General's offices will not answer policy oriented re-
quests, reasoning that the Attorney General's role is to provide legal
advice and not policy counsel. These offices are careful not to use, or
appear to use, their powers as a means to dictate or unduly influence
the policy determinations of state agencies.
41
One can almost hear strains of Mr. Smith Goes to Washington
in the background-but as background music only. As will be dis-
cussed, since this passage was written, the office of the state At-
torney General has undergone an explosion in political potential
and ambition, resulting in a much more frequent interposition of
39. 7A C.J.S. Attorney General § 34 (2004) (citing Chun v. Bd. of Trs. of Employees'
Ret. Sys. of Haw., 952 P.2d 1215 (Haw. 1998)).
40. Id. § 42 (citing People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206 (Cal. 1981)).
41. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., REPRESENTATION OF STATE AGENCIES 9 (1979).
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policy preferences in the lawyering performed by the Attorney
General on behalf of state agencies.
As the above examples amply demonstrate, constitutional con-
flicts are arising between attorneys general and governors, in Vir-
ginia and across the country, with striking frequency. The ques-
tion is how to lessen the tension in a way consistent with law and
constitutional design.
B. Election and Politics
Attorneys general have always suffered from a certain ambigu-
ity. Upon importation to the colonies, it was immediately
clear that the office possessed an unstable conceptual founda-
tion. A Massachusetts Attorney General, for instance, complained
that he "'never could know what was my duty,-What I Should
doe [sic] .... All other officers know their power duty & dues by
the law, but Relating to the King's Atturney [sic] the law is Si-
lent."'42 It has never been quite clear whether the Attorney Gen-
eral is a servant of the sovereign or an independent political actor
in her own right.
The underlying premise driving the independence and relative
authority of the modern Attorney General is her status as an
elected official. Originally, most states chose not to elect their at-
torneys general. In its 1776 Constitution, Virginia's legislature
decided to appoint the Attorney General, who was "viewed pri-
marily as a judicial officer."43 Before 1845, attorneys general were
appointed in twelve states, whether by the Governor, the legisla-
ture, or another authority.44 The populist revolution led by Presi-
dent Andrew Jackson, however, sparked a trend toward the popu-
lar election of many state officials.45 By 1860, eleven of thirty-
three states had popular elections for attorneys general, twenty-
eight of thirty-eight by 1880, thirty-five of forty-five by 1900,
thirty-nine of forty-eight by 1920, and forty-two of forty-nine by
42. OLIVER W. HAMMONDS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 6
(1939) (quoting 7 Mass. Acts & Resolves 709 (1692-1702) [1892]).
43. 2 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 663
(1974).
44. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 19 (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) [hereinafter Ross].
45. See id.
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1959.46 Virginia was in the first wave, deciding to elect its own
Attorney General in 185 1.
47
Today, the Attorney General is popularly elected in forty-three
states. 48 The Governor appoints the office in five states (Alaska,
Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Wyoming, and the District
of Columbia). 9 In Maine, the legislature selects the Attorney
General by secret ballot.5 ° In Tennessee, the supreme court votes
for the office.51
C. Partisanship and Political Entrepreneurship
That most attorneys general are now elected sets up an obvious
contest with the Governor if the two office-holders belong to dif-
ferent parties or are politically competitive. Clashes naturally oc-
cur in states, like Virginia, where the Attorney General is both
elected and a member of a different party than the Governor. Vir-
ginia mirrors the many states whose attorneys general have re-
cently been playing a larger role and advancing more entrepre-
neurial politics. In fact, more than a third of elected state
attorneys general are members of a different political party than
the incumbent Governor. 52 Attorneys general frequently run for
higher office. Of Virginia's last thirteen governors, four first
served as Attorney General: Lindsay Almond, Albertis Harrison,
Gerald Baliles, and Jim Gilmore.53
Perhaps the most significant cause of the constitutional clashes
is the increased ambitions of attorneys general-as a group and
individually. A half-century ago, state attorneys general were
generally politically passive. In government litigation, they usu-
ally played only a defensive role in court, representing their state
46. Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Constitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney Gen-
eral, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. PO'V 1, 6 n. 18 (1993) (citing Byron R. Abernathy, Some Persist-
ing Questions Concerning the Constitutional State Executive 32 (Governmental Research
Center, University of Kansas Report 23 1960)).
47. See 2 HOWARD, supra note 43, at 663.
48. Ross, supra note 44, at 15.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Patrick C. McGinley, Separation of Powers, State Constitutions & the Attorney
General: Who Represents the State?, 99 W. VA. L. REv. 721, 755 (1997).
53. See List of Governors of Virginia, http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/List-
of_Governors-of Virginia (last visited Sept. 20, 2006).
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agencies and government in suits brought by others. 4 The infre-
quent unilateral commencement of actions nearly always took
place at the request of the Governor or other official, rather than
on the initiative of the Attorney General himself.5 " A commenta-
tor as late as 1969 made an observation that would today seem
anomalous: "The majority of students in public administration...
consider the attorney general to be the governor's attorney and
administrator." 6 Moreover, the criminal powers of the Attorney
General were severely limited. While some had prosecutorial ju-
risdiction, it had lapsed in many states, and was exercised only
by local prosecutors.5 7
The trend toward today's activist attorneys general began only
in the late 1950's, with a new focus on protecting consumers, in-
vestors, and the environment. Just as today's New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer has played a prominent national role in
trust-busting and securities regulation,58 in the late 1950s, New
York Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz steered the office in a
new, activist direction, establishing a Consumer Frauds and Pro-
tection Division and a Civil Rights Bureau. 9 His actions set the
pace for attorneys general in states across the nation.6 °
One example of the recent prominence of attorneys general is
the NAAG. Although it was founded in 1907, NAAG has become
increasingly ambitious in recent years by coordinating the collec-
tive efforts of attorneys general to take on challenging and high-
profile legal and political issues. Successes include forty-six at-
torneys general coordinating a successful suit against the tobacco
companies6" and the successful effort of fifty-two attorneys gen-
54. Philip Weinberg, Office of N.Y. Attorney General Sets Pace for Others Na-
tionwide, N.Y . ST. B.J., June 2004, at 10, 10, available at http://www.nysba.org/Con
tentNavigationenu/Attorney-Resources/Bar-Journal/Bar-Journal-Archive/2004-Archive/
journaljune04weinberg.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Henry J. Abraham & Robert R. Benedetti, The State Attorney General: A Friend of
the Court?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 797-98 (1969).
57. Weinberg, supra note 54, at 10.
58. See Brooke A. Masters, Eliot Spitzer Spoils for a Fight: Opponents Blast Unusual
Tactics of N.Y. Attorney General, WASH. POST, May 31, 2004, at Al.
59. See Weinberg, supra note 54, at 11.
60. Id. at 10.
61. Shantar Vedantam, Attorneys General Craft Plan To End Tobacco Lawsuits, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 9, 1998, at 9A; see also Nat'l Assoc. of Attorneys Gen.,
NAAG Projects: Tobacco, http://www.naag.org/issues/issue-tobacco.php (last visited Sept.
20, 2006).
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eral against Ford Motor Company in connection with the ten-
dency of its sport utility vehicles to roll over.2
The effectiveness of the NAAG today has roots in efforts in the
1970's to advocate for the policy of "consolidation," where the At-
torney General has a monopoly on legal representation of all state
officials and agencies. In 1971, the NAAG adopted two resolu-
tions. The first stated, "The Attorney General should have the
sole authority to employ counsel and represent the state in litiga-
tion."6 3 The second stated, "All state legal staff should be under
the Attorney General's supervision; he should determine their
salaries and increments, classifications, and otherwise control
personnel."64 In 1976, the NAAG provided several specific ration-
ales for the policy of consolidation. They included increased effi-
ciency in the delivery of legal services, more accuracy in planning
legal services, increased collaboration and a decreased need to re-
invent the wheel, superior review of legal work than would oth-
erwise occur at the agency level, more consistent application of
statutory and case law, and increased clarity in the responsibili-
ties of the Attorney General and agencies.65
IV. LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S AUTHORITY
A. The Common-Law Model Versus the Statutory Model
The legal rules governing the Attorney General are as complex
as the office's history. Just as we find an often awkward compro-
mise between the legal and political duties of the office, we also
see a difficult marriage of two different political lineages in most
state attorneys general. The first is the English common-law
model of the office, which entails an expansive, unlimited, and
populist conception of the Attorney General's role and responsi-
62. Nat'l Assoc. of Attorneys Gen., Multistate Actions: 52 Attorneys General and the
District of Columbia Corporation Counsel Reach a $51.5 Million Settlement with Ford Mo-
tor Company, http://www.naag.org/issues/20021223-multi-ford.php (last visited Sept. 20,
2006).
63. Ross, supra note 44, at 51.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 51-52.
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bilities.66 The second is a statutory, limited, and delegated model,
which intends the Attorney General to be beholden to other
elected officials, the legislature, and to possess only those specific
powers which are expressly delegated to him by statute or by the
constitution.
Supporters of the common-law view look to the general author-
ity of English law over American constitutional practice. In Eng-
land, the Attorney General first evolved to represent the King in
court, as the King could not appear to represent himself.6" The
idea quickly grew that the Attorney General was in possession of
nearly unlimited powers to act unilaterally as the representative
of the people's legal interests. In one case, a court ruled, "'The At-
torney-General is an officer of the Crown, and in that sense only,
the officer of the public."'69 The responsibility to act for the King
and for the people in general was thus apparently fused in the
common-law model of the office. When America was colonized, the
English Attorney General had grown in stature to the "chief legal
officer of the royal government." °
The most frequently cited list of the English common-law pow-
ers is found in an 1868 New York decision,71 People v. Miner,72
which conferred on the Attorney General certain powers, such as
the ability "[tio prosecute all actions, necessary for the protection
and defence [sic] of the property and revenues of the crown."73
With powers such as these, though unelected, the common-law
state Attorney General became a near-political figure on par with
other elected officials and was entrusted with the same obliga-
tion-to act for the people.
66. See Rita W. Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The Attorney
General in England and the American Colonies, in 2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL
HISTORY 304, 304-05 (Erwin C. Surrency ed., 1958); see also Hugh H.L. Bellot, The Origin
of the Attorney-General, 25 LAW Q. REV. 400, 410-11 (1909).
67. See 2 HOWARD, supra note 43, at 660.
68. See id. at 661.
69. Attorney-General v. Brown, 36 Eng. Rep. 384, 396 (Ch. 1818), quoted in Bill
Aleshire, Note, The Texas Attorney General: Attorney or General?, 20 REV. LITIG. 187, 204
(2000).
70. 2 HOWARD, supra note 43, at 661-62.
71. Ross, supra note 44, at 35.
72. 2 Lans. 396 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1868).
73. Id. at 398.
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The statutory model, on the other hand, is a polar opposite,
holding that the Attorney General is solely a creature of legisla-
tive law. If no statute charters the office, so goes the argument,
the office does not exist, and if no law grants any single ability or
immunity, then the Attorney General entirely lacks that ability
or immunity. A quintessential framing of the proposition is found
in Ryan v. District Court,7 4 a 1972 Nevada decision in which the
Attorney General sought to prosecute a public official for bribery
without consulting the District Attorney. 7 The court ruled:
Assuming, without deciding, that the common law may have granted
the attorney general the power he here seeks to exercise, such an ex-
ercise of power would be repugnant to the statutory law of this state,
as we have already explained. The attorney general may not look to
the common law to justify his action. 7
6
In State v. Davidson,77 the Supreme Court of New Mexico also
ruled against the common law in favor of statute as the source of
the Attorney General's power:
[The common-law doctrine] is based entirely upon the initial premise
that the Attorney General was recognized as being vested with com-
mon-law powers before any attempt was made to enumerate or de-
fine his powers by statute. In New Mexico, the converse of this condi-
tion exists. The powers and duties of the Attorney General were
enumerated by the very statute which created that office. 78
In Arizona State Land Department v. McFate,79 the Supreme
Court of Arizona said "'the Attorney General has no common law
powers."'' 0 Specifically, the court referred to authorizing statutes,
finding: "The statutes relating to the State Land Department and
the State Land Commissioner confirm the role of the Attorney
General as legal advisor and not as policy maker.""
As the case law demonstrates, the statutory model entirely
abandons the idea that the people have some sort of right, a pri-
ori to legislative action, to a single statewide officer representing
74. 503 P.2d 842 (Nev. 1972).
75. Id. at 842-43.
76. Id. at 845 (citations omitted).
77. 275 P. 373 (N.M. 1929).
78. Id. at 375.
79. 348 P.2d 912 (Ariz. 1960).
80. Id. at 914 (quoting Westover v. State, 185 P.2d 315, 318 (Ariz. 1947)); see also
State ex rel. Woods v. Block, 942 P.2d 428, 431 (Ariz. 1997).
81. McFate, 348 P.2d at 917.
[Vol. 41:43
2006] CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 57
them legally. In contrast to the common-law model, the statutory
view entails a subordinate, delegated role for the Attorney Gen-
eral, who acts only when given specific authority either by statute
or by another officer or agency.
Most states today follow the common-law model.8 2 A "signifi-
cant minority," however, have embraced the statutory model, in-
cluding Arizona, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, New Mexico, New
York, Oregon, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 3 The NAAG
itself recognizes that, at most, the common-law model is a modi-
fied default and that legislatures have a strong power over the
Attorney General: "While at common law the Attorney General
had the exclusive power and duty to render legal counsel to the
government, not all courts acknowledge the Attorney General's
common law powers, and most of those that do have recognized
the legislature's right to modify those powers." 4 Moreover, cer-
tain states, such as New Jersey and Hawaii, expressly refer to the
common law in the Attorney General's enabling statutes.8 " Vir-
ginia, however, does not.
B. Governing in Virginia's Constitutional Gray Area
The statutory and common-law models naturally run a collision
course with each other. In the absence of a clear judicial decision
on the matter, the proper scope of the Attorney General's author-
ity can be impossible to define-especially in Virginia. Professor
A.E. Dick Howard, the author of Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion of Virginia, observes, "Whether Virginia's Attorney General
has powers deriving from the common law is not a settled is-
sue." 6 Traditionally, Virginia's Attorney General was thought to
represent an ungainly hybrid of both the common-law and the
statutory models.8 7 As Howard notes, "[lImplicit in the existence
82. Justin G. Davids, Note, State Attorneys General and the Client-Attorney Relation-
ship: Establishing the Power to Sue State Officers, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 365, 372
(2005).
83. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorney General § 7 n.39 (2003).
84. Ross, supra note 44, at 32.
85. See id. at 33-34.
86. 2 HOWARD, supra note 43, at 665.
87. Professor Howard notes that the NAAG has argued the Virginia Attorney General
possesses common-law powers using two cases "of dubious value," Blair v. Marye, 80 Va.
485 (1885), and James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959). 2 HOWARD, supra note
43, at 666 n.37.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
of the Attorney General are common law powers as well as those
specified by Constitution and statute.""8 The awkward design of
the office, combined with Virginia courts' failure to rule decisively
on the correct parameters of the office, have placed the Attorney
General on a collision course with the Governor that runs directly
through the Governor's most direct means of operating the gov-
ernment-administrative agencies. As Professor Howard has
noted, "[Unclear is the extent to which the Attorney General, in
the actual conduct of litigation (e.g., the positions he takes on is-
sues, the filing of responses, the taking of appeals), is subject to
the wishes of whatever state agency or office may be his 'client."'8 9
These words were written in 1974. As we shall see, these issues
were only clarified in 1994, in Wilder v. Attorney General of Vir-
ginia,90 an opinion that has been underappreciated as a resolu-
tion to the increasingly tense posture between Virginia's Gover-
nor and Attorney General.
V. THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL IN VIRGINIA
A. Constitutional Design
A review of the history of the Office of the Attorney General in
Virginia and of the statutory governance of the relationship be-
tween the two branches of government reveals that the clashes
between the Attorney General and Governor stem at least in part
from Virginia's constitutional design. The Virginia Attorney Gen-
eral's political role seems quite constricted by statute. The office
is created by article V, section 15 of the Constitution of Virginia,
which requires that the Attorney General "shall perform such du-
ties... as may be prescribed by law."91 Today's dilemma is rooted
in the most recent changes to the constitution, which were an-
nounced in 1969. The 1969 revisions of Virginia's Constitutional
Commission transferred the Attorney General from the judicial to
the executive article of the constitution. 92 The change meant that
foes of the Attorney General's political independence could no
88. 2 HOWARD, supra note 43, at 661.
89. Id. at 667-68.
90. 247 Va. 119, 439 S.E.2d 398 (1994).
91. VA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
92. See 2 HOWARD, supra note 43, at 664.
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longer argue that her function was solely a function of the judicial
power, and therefore apolitical. It also meant that the Attorney
General could begin to assert powers that were executive in func-
tion, rather than simply judicial, setting the stage for the more
serious conflicts with the Governor that would arise years later.
The alteration did not occur without a fight, however. The
Commission recommended against the transfer, but the Senate
moved the section, and the House later concurred. 93 During this
revision, other changes were also implemented. The Attorney
General would no longer be subject to the removal procedures for
judges.94 Instead, the Attorney General could only be removed
from office through impeachment.95 The revisions also dropped
the requirement of commissioning the Attorney General by the
Governor, placed her third in succession to the Governor, and
gave her a role in certifying any disability of the Governor.96
Finally, the Commission kept the office elective. In its official
report, the Commission noted the controversy over this issue, but
failed to explain its reasoning in refusing to make the Attorney
General an appointed office.9" The Commission simply noted that
"suggestions have been made" to have the Attorney General ap-
pointed, but that "the reasoning which underlay" the 1928
amendments rendering other offices appointed, such as the State
Treasurer or Commissioner of Agriculture, "does not obtain in the
case of the Attorney General."9 8 The Commission made its rec
ommendation with the barest reference to executive independ-
ence, stating: "In the judgment of the Commission, there is merit
in not having the Commonwealth's chief legal officer dependent
upon the executive branch, and hence no change in the method of
selecting the Attorney General is recommended."99
93. Id. at 664 n.23.
94. Id. at 664.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL REVISION 212-13 (1969).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 213.
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B. Representation of Agencies
The battlefield where attorneys general and governors spar-
the representation of state agencies-is governed by Virginia
Code section 2.2-510, which states, "No special counsel shall be
employed for or by the Governor or any state department, institu-
tion, division, commission, board, bureau, agency, entity, official,
justice of the Supreme Court, or judge of any circuit court or dis-
trict court" except in certain cases described in the statute. 100
When the Attorney General is "unable to render" a legal service
to an agency, the Governor may employ special counsel "to render
such service as the Governor may deem necessary and proper."' 1
The process for determining the Attorney General's inability to
serve is two-fold. Under Virginia Code section 2.2-510(1), the
Governor may issue an exemption order "stating with particular-
ity the facts and reasons upon which he bases his conclusion" of
the Attorney General's inability. 12 Under Virginia Code section
2.2-510(4), the Attorney General herself may trigger the Gover-
nor's retention of special counsel by certifying to the Governor
that she has a "conflict of interests, or that [s]he is unable to ren-
der certain legal services."' Under Virginia Code section 2.2-
510(2) and (3), the Attorney General may also act unilaterally to
retain special counsel where it is "impracticable or uneconomical"
for the Attorney General to provide counsel.'O4
The above statutes were first enacted in 1950. Such provisions
requiring the Attorney General exclusively to represent state
agencies most likely stemmed from a concern not with an overly
powerful Governor, but rather with inadequate and inconsistent
legal strategy at the agency level. States across the country were
concerned with having both lawyers and non-lawyers performing
ad hoc counseling services in agencies on legal matters. In West
Virginia, for example, a 1963 legal opinion by the state's Attorney
General focused on the problems of "house counsel" presenting
claims on behalf of one agency while failing to assert claims of
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-510 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
101. Id. § 2.2-510(1) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 2.2-510(4) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
104. Id. § 2.2-510(2)-(3) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
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another agency.1 °5 House counsel might also present claims con-
flicting with those of the Attorney General himself. 106 In addition,
the opinion presented problems relating to the house counsel's
loyalty and ethics: "'With the use of State department-employed
'house counsel' . . . loyalties and psychological influences are too
easily distorted, making it difficult, if not impossible, for such de-
partment-employed attorneys to render independent opinions,
free of bias and influence."'10 7 Similar reasoning was almost cer-
tainly at work in the 1950 Virginia revisions.
C. Statutory Limitations
1. Opinion-Writing is Limited
The Attorney General's independent ability to initiate advice to
agencies is formally limited by the Virginia Code. Virginia Code
section 2.2-505(A) states, "The Attorney General shall give his
advice and render official advisory opinions in writing only when
requested in writing so to do" by members of the General Assem-
bly, a judge of courts of record or courts not of record; the State
Corporation Commission; commonwealth's attorneys; county, city,
or town attorneys; clerks of a court of record; city or county sher-
iffs; city or county treasurers; commissioners of the revenue;
chairmen or secretaries of electoral boards; and the heads of state
departments, divisions, bureaus, institutions or boards."0 ' While
the scope of potential clients is large, the Attorney General has no
power to act unilaterally in soliciting their business.
Virginia Code section 2.2-505(B) further circumscribes the At-
torney General's ability to issue judicial opinions (which, in gen-
eral, have the presumptive force of law)' 9 :
105. See McGinley, supra note 52, at 733 (citing 50 W. VA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. &
OPINIONS 185, 189 (1963)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 734 (quoting 50 W. VA. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONS 185, 192 (1963)).
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-505(A) (Repl. Vol. 2005) (emphasis added).
109. "Although the trend has been away from early court decisions holding attorney
general opinions as binding on the recipients, as a practical matter the opinions work a
prescriptive effect on state government administration and therefore carry legal force
comparable to a court decision." Matheson, supra note 46, at 9 (footnote omitted).
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Except in cases where an opinion is requested by the Governor or a
member of the General Assembly, the Attorney General shall have
no authority to render an official opinion unless the question dealt
with is directly related to the discharge of the duties of the official re-
questing the opinion. 11
0
In other words, the Attorney General may not use a request for
an opinion as a pretext for opinions touching on more expansive
areas of law than the request itself. Moreover, the Attorney Gen-
eral's office issued an opinion on December 27, 2001, further lim-
iting the opinion-writing authority exclusively to questions of law,
rather than matters of fact."'
2. Civil litigation Is Almost Unlimited
A much broader range of action for the Attorney General in
civil litigation is provided by Virginia Code section 2.2-507. Vir-
ginia Code section 2.2-507(A) states that "[a]ll legal service in
civil matters for the Commonwealth, the Governor, and every
state department, institution, division, commission, board, bu-
reau, agency, entity, official, court, or judge ... shall be rendered
and performed by the Attorney General." 112 The only substantial
qualification arrives in Virginia Code section 2.2-507(C), which
states that "[ijf, in the opinion of the Attorney General, it is im-
practicable or uneconomical" for the Attorney General to provide
such counsel, he may employ special counsel.1 13 Under this sec-
tion, the determination of the Attorney General's incapacity to
represent these potential clients rests with the Attorney General
herself. However, the following section also allots that power to
the Governor. 1 4
VI. WILDER V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA
As we have seen, Virginia's Attorney General and Governor
currently jockey for position in a gray area of ambiguity between
the common law and statutes. Case law further indicates unclear
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-505(B) (Repl. Vol. 2005) (emphasis added).
111. 2001 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 73, 74, 76, available at http://www.oag.state.va.us/
OPINIONS/2001Opns/01-047.pdf.
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-507(A) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
113. Id. § 2.2-507(C) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
114. Id. § 2.2-510 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
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parameters on the Attorney General's authority. This gray area
has resulted in substantial constitutional conflicts between the
two offices. Old case law appears to give some weight to the com-
mon-law view at the expense of the statutory model. In 1895, the
Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in Blair v. Marye 115 that the leg-
islature does not have the authority to remove powers from con-
stitutional officers, because the legislative power operates in a
separate sphere from those of the officers created by statute:
The office of attorney-general of Virginia, is of constitutional crea-
tion, and not of legislative enactment .... "We think it may fairly be
assumed in the outset to be an undeniable proposition, that the two
branches of the legislature, as the direct representatives of the peo-
ple, have the right, when no restrictions have been imposed upon
them, either in express terms, or by necessary implication, by the
constitution, to create and abolish offices accordingly as they may
regard them as necessary or superfluous. And that they may also,
under like circumstances, deprive the officers of their salaries, either
directly by removing them from office, or indirectly by so changing
the organization of the departments to which they are attached as to
leave them without a place. But, of course, this power in the legisla-
ture cannot be construed to extend to any of the various classes of of-
ficers which are known as constitutional officers."
1 16
This early decision's emphasis on the constitution, rather than
statutes, as the source of the creation of the Attorney General
seems to lean in favor of the Attorney General in conflicts with
the Governor. Despite the apparent authority found in Blair v.
Marye of at least a mild version of common-law authority, how-
ever, the supreme court seems to have overruled Blair in a 1994
decision, Wilder v. Attorney General of Virginia.
A. Background
Wilder v. Attorney General of Virginia11' stemmed from the ac-
tions of Mary Sue Terry, an enterprising Attorney General who
would later mount a vigorous yet unsuccessful campaign for Gov-
ernor. The dispute hinged on the two adverse constitutional offi-
cers' interpretations of Virginia Code section 2.1-122(a), which
stated, in relevant part:
115. 80 Va. 485 (1885).
116. Id. at 490-91 (quoting Foster v. Jones, 79 Va. 642, 644 (1884)).
117. 247 Va. 119, 439 S.E.2d 398 (1994).
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Where because of the nature of the service to be performed, the At-
torney General's office is unable to render same, the Governor after
issuing an exemption order stating with particularity the facts and
reasons upon which he bases his conclusion that the Attorney Gen-
eral's office is unable to render such service, may employ special
counsel to render such service, may employ special counsel to render
such service as the Governor may deem necessary and proper. 
118
In 1992, Terry disagreed with members of the board of the Vir-
ginia Retirement System ('VRS") on several matters related to
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests. Displeased with
what he saw as the Attorney General's antagonistic stance to-
ward board members of the agency, Governor Doug Wilder re-
sponded on December 10, 1992, with a letter advising her that he
intended to supplant her with special counsel pursuant to Vir-
ginia Code section 2.1-122(a).11 9 He argued that the Attorney
General's representation of individual members of the VRS board
in the FOIA requests "'resulted in [her] drawing and making pub-
lic certain legal and administrative policy conclusions about those
same sensitive matters.""2 He wrote, "'In essence, you have con-
demned the client and then purport to represent the same. The
attorney-client privilege is thereby breached."'12'
The Attorney General responded with a letter on December 11,
1992, in which "[sihe denied any acts of ethical impropriety, and
challenged the Governor's authority to appoint special legal coun-
sel." 122 She argued that Virginia Code section 2.1-121 required
her representation.'23 Virginia Code section 2.1-121 stated that
"[a]ll legal service" for agencies shall be provided by the Attorney
General, and continued, "No regular counsel shall be employed
for or by the Governor or any state department, institution, divi-
sion, commission, board, bureau, agency, entity or official." 24
In a follow-up letter dated December 21, 1992, Governor Wilder
reasoned that the Attorney General had "'render[ed] [her] office
unable to render effective legal representation'" to VRS, because
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 2 .1-122(a) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-510(1) (Repi.
Vol. 2005)).
119. Wilder, 247 Va. at 121, 439 S.E.2d at 400.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 121-22, 439 S.E.2d at 400.
122. Id. at 122, 439 S.E.2d at 400.
123. See id. at 124, 439 S.E. at 401.
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-121 (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-507(A) (Repl.
Vol. 2005)).
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she "'decided to make [her] criticisms and conclusions publicly
rather than maintaining the confidences of [her] clients.""2 Gov-
ernor Wilder explained that Virginia Code section 2.1-122(a) al-
lowed the appointment of special counsel,'26 "Where because of
the nature of the service to be performed, the Attorney General's
office is unable to render such service."' 27 The Governor then ap-
pointed several private attorneys to provide general representa-
tion to the VRS. 28 He stated that they would continue to serve
"'until such time as the conflicts between your office and [the Vir-
ginia Retirement System] have abated and your office will once
again be able to provide legal representation to [the Virginia Re-
tirement System]."'129
B. The Opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia
In an opinion that directly addressed the constitutional scope of
the Attorney General's power versus the Governor, the Supreme
Court of Virginia ruled in favor of Governor Wilder. Chief Justice
Hassell first dismissed the Attorney General's argument that the
trial court's finding that the Governor had appointed "regular"
rather than "special" counsel was a finding of fact alone and
therefore binding on the supreme court under Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Gill."' Instead, the court ruled that the circuit
court's finding was a mixed question of law and fact and therefore
not binding on the court. 131
The court concluded that the question of deciding whether the
lawyers appointed by the Governor were "general" or "special"
could be decided exclusively by the Governor unless his actions
were arbitrary and capricious. 132 The court ruled that the Gover-
125. Wilder, 247 Va. at 122, 439 S.E.2d at 400.
126. Id.
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-122(a) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-510(1) (Repl.
Vol. 2005)).
128. Wilder, 247 Va. at 125, 439 S.E.2d at 402.
129. Id. at 122-23, 439 S.E.2d at 400 (alteration in original).
130. Id. at 124, 439 S.E.2d at 401 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Gill, 224 Va.
92, 95, 294 S.E.2d 840, 841 (1982)).
131. Id.
132. See id. at 125-26,439 S.E.2d at 402.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
nor's actions were not arbitrary and capricious as a matter of
fact. 133
The court then turned to two arguments made by the Attorney
General. The first, an assertion of statutory interpretation that
the words "unable" and "conflict of interest" were mutually exclu-
sive, was quickly dismissed and was of no major significance. 134
The second argument was more substantial, though it was ad-
dressed with little substantive discussion. The Attorney General
argued that Virginia Code section 2.1-122(a) was unconstitutional
because it 'permits a governor to remove duties and powers from
an attorney general and to assume those same powers him-
self."" 3 The Attorney General was clearly arguing for a common-
law theory of an a priori infinite capacity of power for the Attor-
ney General; under that argument, Governor Wilder's actions had
detracted from the limitless, adumbrated powers of the Attorney
General.
In response to the argument, the court observed, as an initial
matter, that the Attorney General had "fail[ed] to identify the
specific constitutional provision that she claims may be impli-
cated." 136 The court expanded:
Article V, § 15 of the Constitution of Virginia unequivocally permits
the General Assembly to prescribe the duties of the Attorney General
and the General Assembly did so by its enactment of statutes such as
Code § 2.1-121. Contrary to the assertion of the Attorney General,
the Governor did not remove her from office when he exercised the
limited grant of power conferred upon him by Code § 2.1-122(a).
Rather, utilizing that grant of power, he appointed special counsel to
represent an agency of the Commonwealth because, in his judgment,
the Attorney General was unable to act. 137
Justice Whiting dissented, arguing that because the counsel ap-
pointed by the Governor would not be confined to "discrete and
limited areas," 131 they did not comport with the "plain meaning of
the adjective 'special."' 139
133. Id. at 126, 439 S.E.2d at 402.
134. See id. at 126-27, 439 S.E.2d at 402-03.
135. Id. at 127, 439 S.E.2d at 403.
136, Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 128, 439 S.E.2d at 404 (Whiting, J., dissenting).
139. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 403 (Whiting, J., dissenting).
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Although it is not expressly framed as such, the majority opin-
ion, taken in the context of the dissenting opinion as well as the
underlying discussion of the Governor's power vis-A-vis that of
the Attorney General, is an endorsement (albeit not a very clear
one) of the statutory theory of the Attorney General in Virginia.
This interpretation is bolstered by the underlying opinion over-
ruled by the supreme court.
C. The Opinion of the Richmond City Circuit Court
In the underlying decision, Judge Robert L. Harris, Sr., of the
Richmond City Circuit Court explicitly ruled in favor of a com-
mon-law theory of the office of the Attorney General. Judge Har-
ris found a "quasi-independent role established for the Attorney
General in Virginia's constitutional scheme," marked by the "dis-
tinct areas of authority" reserved for both the Governor and the
Attorney General. 4 ° Though the court recognized that Virginia
courts have not explicitly recognized the common-law authority of
the Attorney General, Judge Harris held that "the constitutional
and statutory scheme strongly suggest such a conclusion" and ex-
plained, "The obligations of the Attorney General to the public,
under the merging of the English common law treatment with the
American electoral system, is the critical point missed by the
Governor in the instant case."' 4 ' The court explained that the
former common law was "generally continued in force" under Vir-
ginia Code section 1-10 and that "all governmental power is de-
rived from the electorate" under article I, section 2 of the Consti-
tution of Virginia.'42 Finally, the court concluded, "Although in
Virginia, the common law authority of the Attorney General has
not been explicitly recognized by the courts, the constitutional
and statutory scheme strongly suggests such a conclusion."
14 3
The most important concept introduced by Judge Harris was
the notion that the Attorney General's responsibility runs to the
people of Virginia, rather than to the Governor or the agencies he
controls. Harris wrote:
140. Terry v. Wilder, 29 Va. Cir. 418, 425 (Cir. Ct. 1992) (Richmond City).
141. Id. at 428, 430.
142. Id. at 427 (citing VA. CONST. art I, § 2 ("[A]ll power is vested in, and consequently
derived from, the people.. .
143. Id. at 428.
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Under the common law of England, the Attorney General was the le-
gal representative of the Crown, who was the embodiment of "the
rights and liberties of his people." Since, from the American (and
Virginian) perspective, the people's rights needed no such embodi-
ment, it follows that an elected Attorney General, in the American
system, is the people's legal representative. 144
Judge Harris bolstered this conclusion with two points. First, he
observed that Virginia prohibits state entities from employing
their own regular counsel, pursuant to Virginia Code section 2.1-
121, meaning that "the independent role contemplated for the At-
torney General by the Virginia scheme is undiluted."14 The court
drew an analogy from the independence of secretaries and other
officers from the Governor, observing that "' [tihe governor is, nei-
ther in fact nor in theory, personally or politically responsible for
the conduct"' of these officials. 14 Because the agencies are exclu-
sively represented by the Attorney General, the court concluded
that her role "is not subject to intrusion by another elected offi-
cial-in this instance, the Governor-unless some specific statu-
tory authority grants such a power."
147
Under Judge Harris's reasoning, the "popular" model of the At-
torney General would also have implications for the traditional
rules that would otherwise constrain an attorney, both in relation
to attorney-client conduct and in her relationship with the Gov-
ernor. Judge Harris ruled that "[a]lthough some might question
the judgment exercised in the Attorney General's public criticism
of the VRS Board," there was simply nothing to be done in re-
sponse-even by the court itself.'48 Judge Harris continued, "Nei-
ther this Court nor the Governor is empowered to supervise her
job performance."1 49 The logic linked back to the "popular" model:
"Only through subsequent popular elections, or, in particularly
egregious circumstances, the impeachment power, can that per-
formance be second-guessed."5 ° Not only did the court thus em-
brace the common-law model of the office, it endorsed its most
far-reaching implication: that the Attorney General is essentially
144. Id. at 429 (citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 430 (quoting Field v. People, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 79, 118 (1839)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 431.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citation omitted).
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unaccountable to any entity other than the people in the next
election.
D. The Significance of Wilder v. Attorney General of Virginia
As we can see in light of the Supreme Court of Virginia's opin-
ion, the chief problem with the popular model, as presented by
Judge Harris, is a conflict of interest for the Attorney General.
One scholar has framed the issue: "[T]o whom does the attorney
general owe allegiance? Is the attorney general a lawyer for the
state government and its officers, or is she the lawyer for the citi-
zens as a whole? If these two duties are in conflict, which client
prevails?"1"' Wilder v. Attorney General of Virginia finally pro-
vides an answer to that question-just one that has not been
heard.
Viewed against the underlying opinion, the supreme court's de-
cision clearly rejects the common-law theory of the Attorney Gen-
eral in favor of a statutory model, in a ruling that unambiguously
embraces the specific controversy about whether agency repre-
sentation could fairly be decided unilaterally by the Governor.
The strength of the court's opinion may be seen in contrast to
opinions in other states firmly endorsing the common-law model.
For example, in Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp.,1"2 the "au-
thoritative judicial opinion" on the common-law power, 153 there is
a dramatically different discussion of the office:
The office of attorney general is older than the United States and
older than the State of Florida....
[.. IT]he attorneys general of our states have enjoyed a signifi-
cant degree of autonomy. Their duties and powers typically are not
exhaustively defined by either constitution or statute but include all
those exercised at common law....
."The Attorney-General is the attorney and legal guardian of
the people, or of the crown, according to the form of government. His
duties pertain to the Executive Department of the State, and it is his
duty to use means most effectual to the enforcement of the laws, and
151. Davids, supra note 82, at 367.
152. 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976).
153. Ross, supra note 44, at 27.
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the protection of the people, whenever directed by the proper author-
ity, or when occasion arises."
154
Although Wilder fails explicitly to narrate the legal underpin-
nings of its action, it clearly rebuts the sort of premise trumpeted
in cases such as the above-a default deference to the Attorney
General in deciding the parameters of her own powers. In this re-
gard, the decision speaks for itself and seems finally to resolve
the lack of clarity in law that Professor Howard referenced in
Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia, writing that the
"compulsory representation" of the current system "obviously can
be a source of difficulty," and concluding that "the law is still un-
clear" both as to the Attorney General's discretion in refusing
cases and to the desires of the "client" state agency. 155
VII. PROPOSAL: ESTABLISH "GOVERNOR'S COUNSEL" AT AGENCIES
With the implied endorsement of the statutory model in Wilder
v. Attorney General of Virginia, a policy to restore the constitu-
tional balance between the two offices is desirable for two rea-
sons. First, the checks and balances already in place in the Con-
stitution of Virginia are sufficient. One scholar notes, "The idea of
checks and balances is that they operate between, as opposed to
within, the three divisions or departments of government."1"6 The
question of how far to go with checks and balances is an interest-
ing political-theoretical question in its own right, involving one's
wariness over accumulation of power. A recent multi-variate
study by a political science professor at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill ranked the Governor of Virginia only the
twenty-sixth most powerful in the country. 157 This result suggests
scant need for extra-constitutional constraints on his power.
Second, a relatively unitary state executive confers governmen-
tal benefits on the Commonwealth of Virginia. In Federalist No.
70, Alexander Hamilton argued for such a design, contending
that "one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the execu-
154. Shevin, 526 F.2d at 268-70 (footnotes omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Attorney Gen.
v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190, 212 (1869)).
155. 2 HOWARD, supra note 43, at 667-68.
156. Matheson, supra note 46, at 11.
157. See Thad Beyle, Gubernatorial Power: The Institutional Power Ratings for the 50
Governors of the United States, http://www.unc.edu/-beyle/gubnewpwr.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2006).
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tive ... is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibil-
ity.""'8 In other words, to check and balance the executive further
than necessary may distract the public away from the real ac-
complishments of executive branch policy toward simple political
maneuvering. These two arguments taken together suggest that a
Governor should not be stymied in the representation of his own
agencies. Especially because legal issues can sometimes become
political ones, the Governor ought to be able to choose the legal
strategies of his agencies without interference from another ex-
ecutive branch official.
Virginia Code section 2.2-507 currently prohibits the Governor
or any state agency from retaining "regular counsel."1 5 9 A statu-
tory reform that would reset the constitutional balance between
the two constitutional officers would allow the Governor to ap-
point a separate "Governor's counsel" in each agency who would
be in charge of making legal decisions for the agency, and who
would report directly to the Governor. Some of the original con-
cerns underlying the prohibition of in-house counsel-that they
would be overly partisan or simply unaccredited or unprofessional
lawyers 16 0-could be addressed with strict requirements. 161
Over two decades ago, Pennsylvania enacted such a proposal
with a statute that could prove a suitable model for Virginia: the
Commonwealth Attorneys Act of 1980.162 According to one
scholar, the act changed the balance of power in state law en-
forcement. 163 The act provided for an office of General Counsel to
be appointed by the Governor. 164 The General Counsel was
charged with appointing counsel and assistant counsel to execu-
tive agencies and rendering advice to and cooperating with inde-
pendent agencies. 165 Independent agencies were given their own
158. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 11, at 426.
159. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-507(A) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
160. See McGinley, supra note 52, at 733.
161. The idea is also endorsed by Scott Matheson in his authoritative article, supra
note 46. "With a gubernatorially-appointed counsel for state agencies, the accountability of
executive branch agencies would not be confused with the quality of performance of attor-
neys loyal to an independently elected employer." Id. at 29.
162. 1980 Pa. Laws 950.
163. See George Jugovic, Jr., Legislating in the Public Interest: Strict Liability for
Criminal Activity Under the Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act, 22 ENVTL. L.
1375, 1380-82 (1992).
164. 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 732-301 (West 1990).
165. See id. § 732-301(1)-(4).
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agency counsel.1 66 Both the General Counsel and the agency
counsel were allowed to supersede the Attorney General in mat-
ters involving the agencies. 167 If the Attorney General did not ac-
cede to the succession, the Governor could authorize the General
Counsel to "intervene in the litigation," 6 ' or the agency head
could authorize the agency counsel similarly to intervene. 1
69
With this statute, Pennsylvania directly attacked the problem
faced in Virginia today. The Attorney General was maintained as
an independent, elected office, while his ability to control unilat-
erally the course of litigation involving state agencies under the
Governor's control was constrained. The balance of the executive
branch was thus restored. Such a measure could also ameliorate
the constitutional tension present in Virginia and other states
where governors and attorneys general battle over the represen-
tation of state agencies. Moreover, it could be implemented effi-
ciently, with a small number of "Governor's Counsel," each re-
sponsible-like an assistant Attorney General-for a number of
executive agencies. Governor's Counsel would work with the Of-
fice of the Attorney General. But in the event of a conflict in a
matter involving the agency, the Governor's Counsel would be au-
thorized to prevail, thereby restoring control to the Governor over
the legal and policy direction of state agencies while retaining the
Attorney General as an executive officer with proper powers over
the other provinces allotted to her by the Constitution of Virginia
and by statute.
VIII. THE ARGUMENT FOR A DIVIDED EXECUTIVE
Professor William Marshall has taken a dramatically different
position from the foregoing analysis in his article published in the
Yale Law Journal in October 2006.17o Professor Marshall makes a
serious and valuable contribution to a basic idea: that the federal
unitary executive theory deserves examination through the lens
of the state constitutional experience. In his consideration of con-
flicts between governors and attorneys general in the states,
166. Id. § 732-401.
167. Id. § 732-303(a), -403(a).
168. Id. § 732-303(b).
169. Id. § 732-403(b).
170. See Marshall, supra note 14.
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however, Professor Marshall adduces two problematic premises,
which together support a creative, but ultimately unpersuasive,
policy proposal: that the federal Attorney General should be in-
dependent from the President.
A. The Argument for a Divided Executive
Professor Marshall's first premise is that because conflicts be-
tween governors and attorneys general are minor, they are salu-
tary, leading to helpful compromises between the Governor and
Attorney General. 171 Professor Marshall writes:
What is remarkable, then, in reviewing the state experience, is that
debilitating conflict has not materialized. This is not to say that seri-
ous disputes have never occurred or that governors have never com-
plained about having to deal with independent attorneys general (or
vice versa). Certainly they have. And it is also true that the divided
executive has occasionally been the target of reforms that would
make the Attorney General subject to gubernatorial appointment
and removal. But history suggests that both governors and attorneys
general have generally learned to cooperate effectively within a di-
vided executive framework. 1
72
The argument wholly depends on empirical statements-that
conflict "has not" occurred and that the two officers "have gener-
ally learned" to cooperate. However, evidence is not provided, ei-
ther generally or specifically.
The lack of support is unfortunate, because it entails a hyper-
theoretical argument that may not square with actual experience
in the states. The Commonwealth of Virginia provides one exam-
ple. Walter McFarlane, counsel to Governor Wilder during the
dispute with Attorney General Terry that occasioned Wilder v.
Attorney General of Virginia, recounts that the conflict led to a "a
total breakdown of the relationship."'73 The Governor essentially
severed the Attorney General from any discussion of legal issues
during the remainder of his tenure in office.174 In McFarlane's
words:
171. See id. (manuscript at 107-09).
172. Id. (manuscript at 108).
173. Telephone Interview with Walter McFarlane, Former Legal Counsel, Former Gov-
ernor Doug Wilder (Sept. 1, 2006). Mr. McFarlane served over twenty years in the Office of
the Attorney General under both Democratic and Republican Attorneys General.
174. Id.
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Basically, after Terry filed suit, that was the end of any of our dis-
cussions with her on anything that was sensitive. And that's when
she became angry. We were doing things, handling things, that she
thought she should be involved in. But quite frankly if she could di-
vulge anything, we told her, and she could make any decision, we
said to heck with it. 175
A second issue that does not factor into Professor Marshall's
analysis is the very real risk entailed by overt conflict over state
agencies. Again, Virginia serves as evidence. As noted earlier, the
clash between Governor Mark Warner and Attorney General
Kilgore over redistricting in Virginia became so fractious that it
led to illegal acts-the state Republican Party's eavesdropping on
Warner-led conference calls and the indictment and plea of the
Republican Executive Director. 176 When such acts occur, it is im-
probable, if not impossible, to argue that abstract "checks and
balances" have generated harmony.
This is, at the end, an argument about baselines-one person's
conflict may be another's harmony. To some, the concern about a
Governor overstepping certain bounds is so high as to generate a
high tolerance for constitutional conflict. Others may find an in-
dependent Attorney General with both legal and policy powers to
be so salutary for governance that substantial conflict is an ac-
ceptable cost for the benefit. There certainly is no clear answer to
this question, but there are certainly grounds for more debate
than we currently have. The aforementioned Yale Law Journal
symposium on executive power is a good start, as is Professor
Marshall's article.
B. The Argument for Analogizing States to the Federal
Government
A second problem raised by Professor Marshall's argument is
the hard analogy drawn from the states to the federal govern-
ment. Professor Marshall argues that the divided executive model
checks executive branch excess "as its architects intended" and
protects against "executive branch overreaching." 177 In these pur-
175. Id.
176. See Cooper & Whitley, supra note 22.
177. Marshall, supra note 14 (manuscript at 121).
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portedly felicitous aspects, the states provide a model for those
searching to resolve the excesses of the federal unitary executive.
The problem with the constitutional argument is twofold. First,
it simply does not address the current system of checks and bal-
ances at the state level. As has been noted, the "architects" of the
divided executive did not necessarily "intend" for it to result in
serious conflict over state agencies. These conflicts are instead
relatively recent developments, the result of both individual en-
trepreneurial strategies by attorneys general and of collective
strategizing by the NAAG for increased prominence and influ-
ence.
Second, not only does no strong analogy exist between the
checks and balances at the state and federal levels, but there is in
fact grounds for disanalogy. Entirely different concerns are to be
checked and balanced at the state and federal levels. The Presi-
dent has war-making at his disposal. Indeed, the grounds of John
Yoo's unitary executive theory are that the President, because he
needs unified, immediate, and consistent powers in his role as
Commander-in-Chief, ought to have a corresponding constitu-
tional prerogative. An absolute parallel cannot be drawn to a
state Governor, who even in the most heated of instances cannot
match the sheer power of an American President's actions. The
consequences of a President's "overreaching" are therefore expo-
nentially more dangerous than those of a Governor.
C. Interrogating the Unitary Executive Theory
The essential problem is the Attorney General's ability and de-
sire to make policy, not just provide legal counsel. With the same
hopeful tone of the Corpus Juris Secundum section earlier refer-
enced,' Professor Marshall argues for the saving grace of the di-
vided state executive: it "requir[es] the Attorney General to ad-
vance the interests of the Governor when her disagreement is
based on pure policy or upon any other factor deemed to fit best
within the final authority of the Governor.
" 179
But what if the Attorney General simply fails to exercise such
restraint? In an interview, Walter McFarlane recounted Vir-
178. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
179. Marshall, supra note 14 (manuscript at 122).
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ginia's experience following Attorney General Terry's decision to
attempt to discipline what she perceived as irregularities and
poor policy-making by the VRS, against the Governor's wishes.180
McFarlane said, "if the Attorney General has common-law power,
they can decide whether the Governor's policy decisions are
right." 1 ' The question, then, is whether attorneys general ought
to be given this basic authority to determine policy of executive
agencies, even if that policy is cloaked as a "legal" issue. Professor
Marshall repeatedly praises a divided executive at the state level.
But the evidence and arguments suggest instead that a divided
state executive may be the problem, rather than the solution.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Attorney General is a critical and storied position that
rightly should be elected by, and accountable to, the voters. The
Attorney General can and should play an independent role in the
areas for which the office was designed, such as consumer protec-
tion, law enforcement and crime prevention, monitoring the rule
of law, and preventing corruption. However, the Attorney General
should not be directing policy of the government agencies that the
Governor was elected to run. Especially in a time of deep reflec-
tion on the proper meaning and scope of executive governance at
the federal level, we should not invite further complications and
contradictions within the office of the chief executive of the
American state. Statutorily giving the Governor control of the le-
gal representation of her own agencies would restore balance to
the constitutional structure in states like Virginia. Such a change
would help resolve the tortured constitutional status of the At-
torney General, prevent ungainly and inefficient intra-executive
branch conflicts, and maintain the Attorney General as a robust
executive office. The crisis in the executive branch would thus be
addressed, and the Attorney General and Governor returned to
their properly separate constitutional spheres.
180. Telephone Interview with Walter McFarlane, supra note 173.
181. Id.
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